Director James Cameron Produces More than Movies ~ Gulf Oil Well Solutions

James Cameron,  noted director of such films as recent blockbuster "Avatar", as well as "Titanic", The Terminator Series, and producer of many other films, is not just a famous director and producer, but he is also  a screenwriter, an editor and an inventor as well.
In mid-May, Cameron offered BP use of his private fleet of submarines, currently moored in Lake Baikal in the Russian federation. is considered an expert in the technology of deep-sea diving, having used submersibles in a succession of his films.

His 1989 film The Abyss is set underwater around an oil rig where a US nuclear submarine has crashed. The film was shot in a deep-sea canyon in the Caribbean known as the Cayman Trough. The make-believe oil company that owns the rig in Cameron's underwater thriller is called BP, standing for Benthic Petroleum.

In preparation for his 1997 blockbuster, Titanic, he created a new generation of mini remotely operated vessels (ROVs) that were small enough to enter the inside of the sunken ship.

He later returned to the site of the shipwreck to make a 3D documentary of the Titanic remains, Ghosts of the Abyss (2003).

In addition to his own submersible creations, Cameron has worked with the Russian-made Mir submarines on lease from the Russian Academy of Sciences.

He has filmed at depths of as much as two miles – twice the depth of the Deepwater Horizon well.

He once told the public radio network NPR: "There are four submersibles in the world right now that can go to 20,000 feet and, you know, that's like trying to explore an area the size of all the continents of the world put together with four Jeeps."

Cameron also works closely with fellow-Canadian Phil Nuytten, a designer of remotely- and human-controlled deep-sea vessels.

BP turned down the offer, but that didn't stop Cameron from plugging forward with his decision to help in some manner, and so he gathered together 28 experts to see what they could come up with.  The following is part of the report that his group issued:

On June 1, 2010 twenty-eight experts in marine engineering and science, as well as government and oil industry technical advisors, met at the EPA building in Washington to consider possible alternative solutions to capping or controlling the runaway well in the Gulf of Mexico.


The group included leading experts in deep ocean engineering, marine science, remotely operated vehicles, piloted submersibles, offshore oil operations and well control. Also attending were representatives of NOAA, EPA, and the Coast Guard.


Executive Summary
On June 1, 2010, at the invitation of James Cameron, a group of twenty-eight experts in deep ocean engineering and exploration met in Washington, DC. This group included representatives from marine industry, oceanography, government agencies, and ocean advocacy and represented a unique and powerful talent base focused on one purpose: to identify possible solutions to capping and ultimately controlling the runaway Deepwater Horizon well in the Gulf of Mexico.
At meetings end it was recognized that the situation was much more complicated than portrayed through the media and that the potential for making matters dramatically worse was significant. With that in mind this group recommended three near-term solutions.




1. Tap into the 8 additional 3” ports that currently exist
on the BOP to draw off more oil through the second
riser (2nd riser was established for the two 3” lines used
for the kill shot). Using this technique should allow the
capture of significantly more oil than is currently being
recovered. These lines will function in parallel with the
existing LMRP Cap while the new valve/cap is being
fabricated. These additional lines could also be used to
pump heavy mud, and then cement, in a repeat of the top
kill procedure should one be attempted.


2. Replace the existing LMRP Cap with a new cap
that produces a solid seal, and has a valve that can be
controlled from the surface to produce the necessary back
pressure for a more effective top kill procedure. The cap
would be mechanically locked over the existing flange at
the top of the BOP, using hydraulically actuated clamps,
then filled with cement, epoxy or ferrofluid to generate
a permanent seal. A rubber tube or skirt inside the cap
would keep a channel clear for the oil to flow through
while the sealant is injected. Variants on this cap/valve
concept include a temporary or permanent expanding
bladder inserted into the bore of the BOP if the bore is
unrestricted with drill pipe.


3. As an alternative to top kill, it may be possible to
engage the existing drill pipe with an overshot, using
high frequency sonar to image within the venting oil. If
sufficient unobstructed internal clearance exists through
that pipe it could have a tube inserted through it. The
object is to pump heavy mud into the well deep in the
hole. A version of this concept that incorporates an
expanding bladder cap (pipe through the middle of the
bladder) would combine the best of both concepts... back
pressure and deep injection of mud.


The optimal outcome is that some combination of these techniques could be used to kill the well, which is vastly superior to the current situation in which the cap system is estimated to be capturing only about half the oil, and the whole thing is vulnerable to work stoppage in the event of a hurricane. Killing the well is a 100% solution. In addition to consideration of the Deepwater Horizon well itself, the group discussed steps that should be taken to more efficiently manage similar environmental threats in the future.


These included encouragement for the deployment of long term undersea environmental monitoring systems, the establishment of environmental baselines, and the design and development of a rapid response capability consisting of an assortment of platforms and sensors.



(Subsequent to the meeting of the task force BP revealed there are three 16” rupture/burst disks in the well, the condition of which is not known. If their integrity has been compromised any effort at a top-kill has a very low probability of success and may further damage the integrity of the well.)


Conclusions and Recommendations

Regarding BP’s post-accident response, our general conclusion is that BP have assets on scene sufficient to deal with the problem. BP’s expertise is excellent at the engineering level, and the post-incident decisions made to date are, for the most part, correct, at least regarding well control, however we believe that more needs to be done.
Although the media have given the impression of sequential processing of the problem as each new procedure is attempted, it is clear that sufficient parallel processing has been applied to solve the problem on several fronts.  However, external advisory support and analysis from the deep ocean community should have been sought out, both by BP and government, at an early stage
The transparent flow of information from BP to responding agencies and from the marine science/engineering community to the government would have helped enormously. Obtaining critical information on flows, pressures and status of the well was beyond arduous and thus much of it was estimated or inferred.  Going forward, BP should avail itself of the analytical and engineering support offered by the deep ocean community, which is highly expert in deep vehicle design and operation, and in deep ocean operations at depths greater

than the well site.


BP should consider restricting BOP internal pressure at the top flange and then repeating the top-kill, because the LMRP cap is subject to leakage and forced removal in a hurricane. This would involve creating a new cap or plug containing a surface controlled valve. The valve would be used to meter the flow, maintain enough back pressure in the BOP and give the top-kill a greater chance to work. The new cap/plug would make a high pressure seal to the upper flange, as opposed to the LMRP cap’s “loose seal.”


A variant on this idea is using the existing drill pipe, already in the well, or an additional pipe or tube inserted through it (or replacing it) to inject heavy mud all the way to the bottom of the well and attempt a kill that way. BP should be asked if they have analyzed this. The opaque flow of the oil will require the use of high frequency multi-beam sonar to image the pipe’s position inside the BOP. To increase capture of oil, BP should add more 3” lines (same as the choke and kill lines) to take advantage of the multiple valve ports on the stack. This would require significant work with ROVs, but could happen after the LMRP cap is in place. Two and possibly as many as eight 3” lines could be added. These lines would pump more volume of oil to the surface without relying on the LMRP cap. They will also relieve the flow at the LMRP cap and provide backup if it fails or needs maintenance. In addition, they could be used to pump mud into the well bore at high volume in a second attempt at a topkill.


Combined with higher back pressure and fine control of BOP internal pressures from the proposed valve/cap, this could insure success months in advance of the relief well.



A major flaw in the current LMRP cap strategy is that it depends on the ship holding station without interruption. If a hurricane forces the ship to move, the well will vent without restriction into the sea. We predicted during the meeting that the flow would increase significantly when the riser was cut off, and it has more than the predicted 20%. This rate is the new normal any time the LMRP cap is removed because of weather or loss of function. With a minimum of two months required to complete the relief wells, we recommend that another attempt to kill the well be made soon.



BP has assets on scene sufficient to deal with the control of the well. The deep ocean community has vehicles that could assist, but they are unnecessary for work directly at the well, and integrating working styles with the offshore ROV operators already on the scene would be counter productive.


However, assets like ROV’s, 3D cameras, and manned submersibles from the deep ocean community should be employed by government agencies immediately to independently image and monitor the site and the midwater and benthic communities. Quantitative optical imaging in 3D and from uncompressed sources could be used to monitor flow rates. Acoustic volumetric monitoring similar to what has been accomplished at deep sea hydrothermal vent sites could be utilized. Right now the government is relying on the perpetrator’s poor-quality surveillance video of the crime scene.



Commander Greene of Coast Guard assured us that all command decisions were being made jointly between BP and USCG. But this can only truly happen if Incident Command has an independent flow of data and imaging, to make informed decisions. Currently it does not. We recommend independent imaging and data acquisition in situ within visual range of the work as it proceeds. This would allow the government to monitor progress, leakage, and scan for additional leaks and hazards, as well as have a data set for accident investigation, independent analysis of well control efforts, and flow measurement.





Coordination of all vehicles on the bottom is critical so as not to impede the critical work at the well site, but can be done. This group has extensive experience in operating multiple vehicles, both piloted and ROV, within a small theater of operations. Piloted vehicles and fiber-spooling vehicles could approach the well by traversing across the bottom from a deployment point outside the cluster of ships directly over the work site, so as to not interact with BP’s ROVs, tethers, and risers.



In addition to independent imaging and monitoring of the site, the responsible agencies should look to our group to assist with incident investigation. Phoenix has performed search and recovery operations for the US Navy under Sup/Salv. Lightstorm, working with the Russian Academy of Sciences Mir research subs, has carried out exterior and interior forensics studies at Titanic and Bismarck. (Both wrecks are at much greater depths than the blown out well.) Woods Hole has decades of experience with deep-sea surveys, bottom mosaics and marine archeology including the Titanic wreck site and Challenger debris field.


There is no better capability anywhere in the world.



Creating a definitive seafloor survey of the site, including the wreck of the Deepwater Horizon, will be a critical part of the accident investigation. Members of this group have extensive experience operating small fiberspooling ROVs inside shipwrecks hundreds of feet and several decks away from the entry point. It may be possible to recover valuable data from the Deepwater Horizon that could assist in understanding the accident. A comprehensive interior and exterior survey of the wreck should be performed as a basic part of the investigation. Our experience with wrecks is that “the steel does not lie.” Deepwater Horizon holds many answers to urgent questions.


Many of the people in the room will be involved in studies to determine the damage to the environment below the ocean’s surface. There was a strong level of commitment and desire to work cooperatively in an unprecedented way.  Typically these institutions organize vertically under their funding agencies (Navy, NOAA, NSF and others) and work in an uncoordinated fashion.


Dealing with the aftermath of the biggest environmental disaster in US history will require unprecedented coordination; all present were eager to work within this framework. Craig McLean of NOAA offered to function as a pro-tem hub for that effort, specifically in creating a master list of assets and capabilities.



One example of this kind of coordination is the need to establish a centralized database for existing Gulf samples, imaging, and research currently residing within many institutions and researchers. What the conditions were before the spill and how much good data exists is critical generating a baseline for the
upcoming studies. It will also be important to standardize the instrumentation, regardless of the vehicular platform, so that the same types of data are coming in from all measurement sites.


Different institutions have different ships, ROV’s, AUV’s, manned subs, and deep-sea capabilities, so it will be important to cast each one in its right role. We also concluded that this group represented an excellent nucleus for a Rapid Response Team to deal with deep ocean incidents environmental or otherwise.
(Such as the search still underway for the Air France black box.) There are precedents for this in earthquakes, submarine rescue, and aircraft disasters
.
The team would be international and have a webbased inventory of private-public sector deep-sea scientists, technical systems and scientific packages. It would have a central command structure. It would be an independent body that governments could call on for high-resolution imaging and scientific accuracy. It was agreed to follow up on this idea; one of our members offered to host a meeting on the subject at his institution.



We are finished with regard to our recommendations on the well control and oil capture task (unless specific recommendations are adopted and create ongoing engineering or execution roles for some of the members), but we believe that this is just the start of the conversation for the coordinated research, site survey, independent site monitoring, and rapid response concepts.

http://www.whoi.edu/fileserver.do?id=64023&pt=10&p=43992

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Oil Spill Page:
http://www.whoi.edu/topic/oilspills/

Despite the lampooning David Cameron took in the media for his offers to help, this report shows how important his help could be to the U.S. in their independent investigation into the Deepwater Horizon Explosion that resulted in the rig's sinking and creating the worst environmental disaster this country has ever faced.  His group is willing to work with helping BP to stop or reduce the flow of oil into the gulf, in assisting the U.S. in gathering evidence for the investigation, and to help create a group that would be capable of responding to disasters around the globe.

I am impressed with the report and am doubly impressed with Mr. Cameron's desire to help not just in this situation, but others that might arise.

What is New with the Oil Spill? Part IV

Part IV

As a reminder of what is going on in the Gulf Of Mexico



Biologist Mandy Tumlin from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries recovers a dead dolphin off of Grand Isle, Louisiana, on
Saturday, May 29, 2010. The dolphin will be taken for testing to see if
its death was due to exposure to toxins from the Gulf of Mexico oil
spill.
Link To Info


The Last picture I posted of a Dolphin was one in which its skin was covered with Chemical burns.  This one seems to have avoided that fate, but if it did die of exposure to toxins, will we ever hear about it?  Not if BP and officials have their way as we are not being kept informed of the true nature of what is happening with any and all aspects of this spill.

Do you suppose if pictures like these were on the news cycles constantly that people would be more up in arms about this?  I do and I think that is the exact reason that these types of photo are not on the 24 hour cycle.

We have more or less stopped the majority of the clean up efforts despite what we hear from both BP & the Coast Guard, as all boats and crew that were out on the gulf cleaning up the oil were recalled after several people got sick due to exposure to the toxic chemicals from both the oil itself and the chemicals in the dispersant being used.     This was not unexpected as Dr. Riki Ott has predicted this would happen and has even written to and personally spoken to members of congress about the effects of these chemicals on the body and brain of people as well as animals (and she did this prior to this spill, but since the spill occurred, she has been vocal about the dangers).  

Oil cleanup ships ordered to shore after crew members report illness

The U.S. Coast Guard on Wednesday ordered all ships participating in the BP oil spill cleanup in Breton Sound, La., to cease operations for the time being after crew members on three boats  reported health problems.

Four crew members reported nausea, dizziness, headaches and chest pains Wednesday afternoon after working near the oil. One person was flown to West Jefferson Hospital in Marrero, La., another was taken to the same facility by boat, and two were transported by ambulance, according to the Joint Incident Command in Houma, La.. The other crew members refused treatment at the dock.

The illnesses came a day after  BP  reported that it had heard no health complaints from local fishermen who had taken jobs with the company, laying booms and skimming oil from the Gulf. The Times reported that several fishermen complained of similar symptoms while working around oil and chemical  dispersants.

Even as the oil company dismissed the claims, a Louisiana congressman pressed a request to the federal Health and Human Services Department for assistance in placing mobile health clinics in rural areas of south Louisiana where oystermen and shrimpers live.

As a precaution, the Unified Command directed all 125 of the commercial vessels that had been outfitted with equipment for oil recovery operations in the Breton Sound area to return to their temporary accommodations.  Medical personnel were being sent to evaluate the remaining crew members as an additional precaution.

Oil cleanup ships ordered to shore after crew members report illness



Despite knowing of the potential dangers of exposure to the chemical soup, clean up crews have not been given the proper equipment needed to protect themselves from this exposure and instead of supplying the people with the proper equipment (which consists of rubber boots, rubber gloves, protective clothing and special respirators) instead they have simply called the boats in and refused to allow people to go back out.   Where is OSHA in this mess?  Good question.   Why is the Coast Guard, who is the Incident Command on this disaster, allowing this to happen?

At this link you can see for yourself what is considered “Proper Equipment” for those dealing with toxic or hazardous materials, but they do include boots, gloves, &  respirators.
Keeping Workers Safe During Oil Spill Response & Clean Up Operations:
OSHA Regulations

How often have you seen pictures of those working down there wearing the respirators?

A friend in New Orleans is concerned about the oil fumes now engulfing the southern part of town. He says it “smells pretty strong–stronger than standing in a busy mechanics shop, but not as bad as the bus station in Tijuana.”

State health officials are warning people who are sensitive to reduced air quality to stay indoors, but anyone who experiences the classic symptoms of crude oil overexposure–nausea, vomiting, headaches, or cold or flu-like symptoms–should seek medical help.

This is serious: Oil spill cleanups are regulated as hazardous waste cleanups because oil is, in fact, hazardous to health. Breathing oil fumes is extremely harmful.

After the 2002 Prestige oil spill off Galicia, Spain, and the 2007 Hebei Spirit oil spill in South Korea, medical doctors found fishermen and cleanup workers suffered from respiratory problems, central nervous system problems (headaches, nausea, dizziness, etc.), and even genetic damage (South Korea). I have attended two international conferences the past two years to share information with these doctors.

During the Exxon Valdez spill, health problems among cleanup workers became so widespread, so fast, that medical doctors, among others, sounded warnings. Dr. Robert Rigg, former Alaska medical director for Standard Alaska (BP), warned, “It is a known fact that neurologic changes (brain damage), skin disorders (including cancer), liver and kidney damage, cancer of other organ systems, and medical complications–secondary to exposure to working unprotected in (or inadequately protected)–can and will occur to workers exposed to crude oil and other petrochemical by-products. While short-term complaints, i.e., skin irritation, nausea, dizziness, pulmonary symptoms, etc., may be the initial signs of exposure and toxicity, the more serious long-term effects must be prevented.”[1]

Unfortunately, Exxon called the short-term symptoms, “the Valdez Crud,” and dismissed 6,722 cases of respiratory claims from cleanup workers as “colds or flu” using an exemption under OSHA’s hazardous waste cleanup reporting requirements.[2]

Sadly,  sick Exxon cleanup workers were left to suffer and pay their own medical expenses. I know of many who have been disabled by their illnesses – or have died.

I have repeatedly warned Congress in letters and in person to strike that loophole because it exempts the very work-related injuries–chemical induced illnesses–that OSHA is supposedly designed to protect workers from.

Remember the “Katrina Crud” and the “911 Crud?” Standby for the “Gulf Crud” because ourfederal laws do not adequately protect worker safety or public health from the very real threat of breathing oil vapors, including low levels typically found in our industrial ports, our highways during rush hour traffic, and our urban cities.

Oil is not only harmful to people, it is deadly to wildlife. I am sickened to think of the short-term destruction and long-term devastation that will happen along America’s biologically rich coastal wetlands – a national treasure and a regional source of income.

Riki Ott: Lessons From the Exxon Valdez Spill


BP learned a lot of lessons from the Exxon Valdez spill and is in full PR spin mode right now and it seems that our current administration is willing to go along with it.   BP has refused to allow the proper equipment for clean up crews and it has been suggested by several people that BP has also told people that if they use the proper equipment they will be fired.   Why?  PR baby, PR.   How bad would it look on television if you had tons of people walking around in special respirators to protect themselves?   It would make things look much worse than what BP is trying to imply the situation truly is.   We can’t have that now can we?

For weeks, cleanup crews hired by BP have been reporting health issues, but their complaints have largely been ignored. As recently as Tuesday, BP spokesperson Graham MacEwen told the Los Angeles Times he was unaware of any health complaints among cleanup workers. BP has refused to provide respirators to many hired fishermen, and the company has reportedly threatened to fire workers who use their own respirators on the job.

(Transcript of interview between and Juan GONZALEZ & AMY GOODMAN

and  guests  Clint Guidry, president of the Louisiana Shrimp Association.  Albert Huang, environmental justice attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council.

BP Threatens Workers With Firing & Refuses to Provide Or Allow Respirators


BP 'systemic failure' endangers Gulf cleanup workers

WASHINGTON — Federal regulators complained in a scathing internal memo about "significant deficiencies" in BP's handling of the safety of oil spill workers and asked the Coast Guard to help pressure the company to address a litany of concerns.

The memo, written by a Labor Department official earlier this week and obtained by McClatchy , reveals the Obama administration's growing concerns about potential health and safety problems posed by the oil spill and its inability to force BP to respond to them.

BP said it's deployed 22,000 workers to combat the spill, which experts now estimate has spewed 37 million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico . At this point, much of the oil remains offshore.

David Michaels , the assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health who wrote the memo, raised the concerns on Tuesday, the day before seven oil spill workers on boats off the coast of Louisiana were hospitalized after they experienced nausea, dizziness and headaches.

Late Friday, the disaster response team sent four more workers to the hospital by helicopter, including two with chest pains.

In his memo to Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen , Michaels said his agency has witnessed numerous problems at several work sites and staging areas through the Gulf Coast region.

"The organizational systems that BP currently has in place, particularly those related to worker safety and health training, protective equipment, and site monitoring, are not adequate for the current situation or the projected increase in clean-up operations," Michaels said in the memo.

"I want to stress that these are not isolated problems," he continued. "They appear to be indicative of a general systemic failure on BP's part, to ensure the safety and health of those responding to this disaster."

Michaels added that BP "has also not been forthcoming with basic, but critical, safety

and health information on injuries and exposures."

Michaels raised the alarm about BP as his own agency was coming under fire for not being aggressive enough in monitoring the company or the contractors who are providing oil spill cleanup training.

Graham MacEwen , a spokesman for BP, maintained that his company is being responsive to any problems as they develop.

"We consider safety a number one priority," he said. "We will continue to try to improve our safety record."

A Big Difference Between Reports by Boots On The Ground & What BP Is Claiming Regarding Worker Safety


To date nearly ¾ of a million gallons, over 700,000 gallons of the dispersant CoreXit have been dumped into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.  This is the largest use of toxic dispersants ever used in history, and lest we forget this is a substance which has been banned in other countries due to its toxicity in sea & wildlife.

The potential for health problems with the human population is great, and the threat to the sea and wildlife is even greater.

The two types of dispersants BP is spraying in the Gulf of Mexico are banned for use on oil spills in the U.K. As EPA-approved products, BP has been using them in greater quantities than dispersants have ever been used in the history of U.S. oil spills.

BP is using two products from a line of dispersants called Corexit, which EPA data appear to show is more toxic and less effective on South Louisiana crude than other available dispersants, according to Greenwire.

BP Using Dispersant’s In Gulf Spill That Are Banned in UK




Air tests from the Louisiana coast reveal human health threats from the oil disaster

The media coverage of the BP oil disaster to date has focused largely on the threats to wildlife, but the latest evaluation of air monitoring data shows a serious threat to human health from airborne chemicals emitted by the ongoing deepwater gusher.

Louisiana Environmental Action Network released its analysis of air monitoring test results by the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA's air testing data comes from Venice, a coastal community 75 miles south of New Orleans in Louisiana's Plaquemines Parish.

The findings show that levels of airborne chemicals have far exceeded state standards and what's considered safe for human exposure.

For instance, hydrogen sulfide has been detected at concentrations more than 100 times greater than the level known to cause physical reactions in people. Among the health effects of hydrogen sulfide exposure are eye and respiratory irritation as well as nausea, dizziness, confusion and headache.

The concentration threshold for people to experience physical symptoms from hydrogen sulfide is about 5 to 10 parts per billion. But as recently as last Thursday, the EPA measured levels at 1,000 ppb. The highest levels of airborne hydrogen sulfide measured so far were on May 3, at 1,192 ppb.

Testing data also shows levels of volatile organic chemicals that far exceed Louisiana's own ambient air standards. VOCs cause acute physical health symptoms including eye, skin and respiratory irritation as well as headaches, dizziness, weakness, nausea and confusion.

Louisiana's ambient air standard for the VOC benzene, for example, is 3.76 ppb (parts per billion), while its standard for methylene chloride is 61.25 ppb. Long-term exposure to airborne benzene has been linked to cancer, while the EPA considers methylene chloride a probable carcinogen.

Air testing results show VOC concentrations far above these state standards. On May 6, for example, the EPA measured VOCs at levels of 483 ppb. The highest levels detected to date were on April 30, at 3,084 ppb, following by May 2, at 3,416 ppb.

Air Tests From Louisiana Coast Reveal Human Health Threats From The Oil Spill Disaster

Now this information tells us that not only are the levels off the charts for what is considered acceptable, but it is to be expected with these levels that people will get sick.  So knowing this why are there not warnings being sounded about the dangerous nature of what is being found?  Tourists have still been encouraged to visit and take their vacations with the claims of the area being safe, and yet all the information we are finding is saying the exact opposite, and imagine the danger to the people living here and breathing in these high levels of toxicity on a daily basis for who knows how long.  Do we think that things will be any different than they were for those who suffered health problems during and after the Exxon Valdez spill?  It will be far worse because there is a larger spill, with more dispersants being used than any other time in history and there is a larger concentration of people not to mention the length of time that this has been going on and will continue to go on.  We know that the relief wells will not be able to be completed drilling until August at the earliest, so we are talking months and months of exposure .

Coastal Wildlife Vulnerable to Gulf Oil Spill:

Link To Above InfoGraphic Provided by Defenders Of Wildlife


The Material Safety Data Sheet on the CoreXit (Dispersant being used to hide the oil from the spill) shows that no toxicity studies were done on this product.

Material  Safety Data Sheet for CoreXit

If you look at #3 titled Hazardous Identification on that data sheet you will see this:

**Emergancy Overview** and it states:

WARNING:

Combustible.Keep away from heat. Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking. Keep container tightly closed. Do not getin eyes, on skin, on clothing. Do not take internally. Avoid breathing vapor. Use with adequate ventilation. In caseof contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek medical advice. After contact with skin, washimmediately with plenty of soap and water.Wear suitable protective clothing.Low Fire Hazard; liquids may burn upon heating to temperatures at or above the flash point. May evolve oxides ofcarbon (COx) under fire conditions. May evolve oxides of sulfur (SOx) under fire conditions

HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS - ACUTE

Then we have #11 titled “Toxicological Information”

No toxicity studies have been conducted on this product.

And yet if you jump to #16 titled  “Other Information” it states:

We have evaluated our product's risk as follows:

* The human risk is: Low

* The environmental risk is: Low

So we have a lot of conflicting information on this “Self Report” by the makers of CoreXit.  They have evaluated the product’s risk as low to both humans and the environment but I would have to ask, low in comparison to what?  Why a hazard warning, and why are their reports we have from the Exxon Valdez spill that indicates the exact opposite of what the Safety Data Sheet is saying?   And again if there is low toxicity levels then why is it banned in the UK due to the toxic nature?  There seems to be no question that this substance is harming both the sea & wildlife but is adding to the toxicity problems among the human population as well, so why was its use not stopped altogether?

BP was actually told to stop using it and they told the EPA no.  BP sent along its own findings stating that they felt it was the best possible option and that it would continue to use it.  We already know that it isn't the best possible option, and that BP already had ordered other dispersant's which are or were sitting in Houston Tx just waiting to be used (they were bought and paid for by BP as I indicated in a previous post),  but we also know that there is a direct connection between BP and the company that makes CoreXit.   That does seem to be a reoccurring theme throughout this disaster.

Once BP said no to the EPA, one would think that our government officials would have stepped in if the EPA didn't have the balls to step up to the plate and do something about BP's refusal to follow the demands of our own Environmental Protection Agency, but instead the EPA just backed down altogether and asked (not demanded) that BP use less of the dispersant than they were currently doing.   That seems to have been the compromise.

So as we can see, BP has been running this show from day 1 regardless of what the President and his administration are telling us.  They have deferred to BP in nearly every instance and this has been happening all along and looks to continue this way.

More to come in Part V.....